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    Paying physicians for quality: evidence and themes from the field

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    Authors
    Conrad, Douglas A.
    Saver, Barry G.
    Court, Beverly
    Heath, Sarah
    UMass Chan Affiliations
    Department of Family Medicine and Community Health
    Meyers Primary Care Institute
    Document Type
    Journal Article
    Publication Date
    2006-08-01
    Keywords
    Hospital Administrators
    Humans
    Organizational Culture
    Organizational Objectives
    Physician Executives
    *Physicians
    Quality Assurance, Health Care
    Quality Indicators, Health Care
    Reimbursement, Incentive
    Health Services Administration
    Health Services Research
    Primary Care
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    Link to Full Text
    http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/jcaho/jcjqs/2006/00000032/00000008/art00004
    Abstract
    BACKGROUND: Health plans, self-insured employers, health plans, and provider organizations are currently introducing financial incentives that reward physicians for delivering high-quality medical care. Yet a review of existing research reveals virtually no empirical studies of the effect of direct, internal quality incentives on physician performance. Key-informant interviews with leaders of provider organizations should shed new light on evolving quality incentives within organizations. METHODS: Structured key-informant interviews with administrators and medical directors in 22 medical groups and 9 hospitals affiliated with 10 large, integrated health systems were conducted from July 2003 through January 2004. FINDINGS: Views on the role of financial incentives varied widely and were related to a number of other factors, including institutional culture, community context, organizational strategy and structure, organizational stability, quality measurement, nature and size of incentives, and the sustainability of interventions. DISCUSSION: These findings have implications for the acceptability and structure of financial incentives for quality directed to health care provider organizations. A set of considerations for the design and implementation of quality incentives relate to the incentives' scope, controllability, transparency, size, and orientation (individual or team), as well as the relationship between the extrinsic financial incentives and professionals' intrinsic motivation.
    Source

    Jt Comm J Qual Patient Saf. 2006 Aug;32(8):443-51.

    Permanent Link to this Item
    http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14038/37168
    PubMed ID
    16955863
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    UMass Chan Faculty and Researcher Publications

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